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[WHOLE No. 120.]

SEMINOLE CAMPAIGN.

From the Globe, April 15.

TO THE PUBLIC.

A friend has sent me a short extract from the evidence recently given before the Military Court at Frederick, by Gen. CLINCH, together with copies of some letters presented by him. In his testimony Gen. Clinch charges me with neglecting to make adequate preparations for the defence of Florida, upon his representations, during the progress of the difficulties with the Seminole Indians, and for some time after the commencement of hostilities.

The failure of a campaign is an old subject for crimination and recrimination. In all ages and nations it has been fertile in disputes, sometimes confined to the officers themselves, and sometimes extending to the administration of the Government. Knowing that while in the Department of War, I anxiously endeavored to fulfil the duty which the troubles with the Seminoles imposed upon the Government, and satisfied, on as dispassionate a review as a person can be expected to take in a matter which so nearly concerns him, that that duty was faithfully performed, I am not willing to be subject to the imputation which Gen. Clinch has so cavalierly cast upon me. If the course of events in Florida, whether attributable to imbecility, to misfortune, or to circumstances beyond control, may seem to the military commanders to require a propitiatory sacrifice, I shall most assuredly not submit to receive upon my head their maledictions without an appeal to the justice of my countrymen. That appeal I am now led to make; but, in the performance of this task, it is not my object to assail any one. I carry on no Carthaginian warfare, and shall confine myself to repelling a serious imputation laid upon me. I beg that it may be recollected that I am far from home, and that I am destitute of many documents essential to a full investigation of the statement of Gen. Clinch. I have no papers upon the subject excepting those already alluded to—the two pamphlets of documents published by order of Congress in the session of 1835 and 1836, and for which I am indebted to the same friend, and the defence of Gen. Scott, published in the National Intelligencer. For all else I must rely upon my memory; but I trust I shall commit no important error. I am sure I shall commit no intentional one.

An examination of the general course of operations in Florida does not come within the scope of inquiry which I propose to myself. It is enough upon this point to say that each of the commanding generals serving in that country after the commencement of hostilities, had *carte blanche* as to men, and means, and plans. Their measures were left to their own discretion; and they were authorized to call from the neighboring States such force as they might judge adequate to the attainment of the objects committed to them; and the various military departments were directed to provide and furnish all the supplies demanded. It follows, of course, that the Government was not responsible for results. They did what every wise Government should do in such a juncture. They sanctioned the full employment of all the means judged necessary by those upon whom was to devolve the conduct of the war. The main reliance was necessarily upon the militia. The small amount of our regular army, its dispersed condition, and the numerous points it is called upon to maintain, rendered it impracticable to carry on operations by its means alone; and, added to these considerations, there were, during a part of the Seminole campaign, strong rea-

sons, which all will appreciate, having reference to our foreign relations, which rendered it inexpedient to withdraw all the troops from the Atlantic and the southwestern frontiers.

After the incipient measures, the actual, and only responsibility of the Government was in the selection of the officers to command. Upon this point I have nothing to say. I would not utter a word of reproach against any of the gallant men who have served in Florida. I would not, if I could, tarnish a single laurel gathered in other and happier fields. The difficulties they had to encounter were great, and in some points unexpected. And I believe that the general conduct of our officers and soldiers during this trying warfare, was worthy of the best period in our military annals. Of the military service and claims of General Scott, few have a higher estimate than I have, and no person has heard me utter a sentiment of disrespect towards him. Nor shall I reproach myself for any part which I took in his selection for the command. Success is not always a true test of merit, nor the want of it of incapacity. When Gen. Scott took the command the season of operations was short. Every thing was to collect, to combine, to organize. I saw his difficulties then, and I can still better appreciate them now.

I may be permitted to say, however, that his plan of operations did not seem to me well adapted to the nature of the country and the habits of the enemy; and this fact is known to some of the persons officially connected with me in the War Department. The opinion of the President upon this subject was still stronger, and is of course entitled to much more weight than mine. I recollect perfectly his views, when the letter of Gen. Scott, disclosing his plan, was read to him. But any change by the authority of the government, would have been a hazardous experiment. General Scott was upon the spot, with the best means of information, and with all the intelligence and experience necessary to devise and to execute. To have overruled him would have been to assume a most fearful responsibility, and to direct the details of a campaign in an Indian country at the distance of a thousand miles.

I observe in General Scott's defence is a quotation from the testimony of Captain Thruston, a most intelligent officer, by which it appears that the first impression upon his mind was unfavorable to the contemplated plan, but that subsequent experience had corrected this opinion. Not having had the advantage enjoyed by Captain Thruston, of a personal knowledge of the course of operations in Florida, it will not, I trust, be imputed to any unjust prejudice, that I participated in the opinion of an officer who is held in high esteem by General Scott, and that I retained that opinion, not having seen any sufficient reason for changing it. I did not see how a combined operation against such an enemy as the Indians, here to-day and gone to-morrow, and whose presence is seldom known but by their assaults, could be carried on simultaneously from three points so distant as Volusia, Fort Drane, and Tampa Bay, with any reasonable hope of a co operation, which would bring the enemy to action, and at the same time prevent this escape. I did not think that when these masses were brought to a point—when the net was drawn—that the game would be caught. I am free, however, to confess that I have now doubts whether any other plan would have succeeded better at that time, and within the short space remaining for the service of the militia, and for the season of operations; and as neither of the columns was attacked, no positive injury resulted from the division. The enemy was sought and could not be found.

But to the main point of this appeal. General Clinch was asked by the Court, "What in your opinion prevented the subjection of the Seminole Indians in the

campaign conducted by General Scott, in Florida, in 1836?"

To this General Clinch answers, in substance, that it was owing to the neglect of the head of the War Department in not having made more adequate preparations in 1835, and early in 1836. In other words, because there were not troops enough in Florida to prevent the Indians from commencing hostilities; therefore the campaign to reduce them was unsuccessful. I leave to the Court itself and to General Clinch the task of reconciling this answer with the question itself, and the objects of the inquiry. The causes of the Indian hostilities, or the measures taken by the Government to prevent them previously to the assumption of the command by General Scott, were not subjects before the Court. They were questions of public policy, properly cognizable by Congress alone, and which had more than once engaged the attention of that body. But between them and the nature of the military operations there was no just connection; and whether there were in the country, before the war, ten men or ten thousand, was a question having no relation to the duties of the Court or the conduct of General Scott.

But General Clinch goes still further; quite far enough indeed to disclose that his feelings were so much excited, as to weaken very much his perceptions of what he owed to the Court, to himself, and to me. He says, "when at last the honorable Secretary awoke from his dreams of political preferment, and turned his attention," &c. And this General Clinch says, as a witness, under the sanction of an oath. He undertakes to dive into the recesses of the human heart, not as a matter of speculation, but of assertion; and to pronounce on the witness's stand, not only that I neglected my duty, but upon the motives which influenced me. Whether in the alleged neglect, or in the motives assigned, he is right, I shall leave to our common country to decide. I may be allowed, however, to say, that I trust this paper will be read by some, and by some who enjoy the confidence of their country, who will exonerate me from the charge of overweening ambition. I am sure General Clinch, in his cooler moments, will be satisfied that he has done me wrong. I do not know him personally, but those who do, speak of him as a man of high honor. I saw in a newspaper, a short time since, an account of a dinner given, I think, to General Clinch in Florida. An address made by him upon that occasion, discloses undoubtedly the wrongs which he supposes he has received at my hands, and the feelings which this sentiment has inspired. He attributed to me his being superseded in command, and to the President the return of his commission, which he had tendered, accompanied with the hope that he would continue in service. He evidently supposed that I had purposely injured him, and that the mark of favor he received was without my participation, or against my consent. I owe to General Clinch no explanation. A morbid sensibility, or some other motive not more worthy of tolerance, has led him to mistake his own claims and situation, and to become the vehicle of unjust imputations. But as this subject has excited much discussion, and connects itself with the purpose of this statement, I think it right to allude briefly to the causes which led to the change of command.

Two reasons produced this measure. The occurrences in Florida in the month of December, 1835, information of which reached Washington in January, 1836, led to the conviction, that measures upon a more enlarged scale had become necessary, and at the same time reports were received, indicating that the Creeks had manifested a determination to join the Seminoles in hostilities. As two series of operations, under different officers, against enemies near enough to co-operate, and with the same habits, feelings, and objects, were to be avoided, if practicable, and as the amount of force to be called into service might be such as to justify the States furnishing troops, in sending into the field major generals with their requisitions, it was obviously necessary to vest the principal command in an officer of the highest rank in our service. It was very desirable to have an officer of established character and experience, particularly in a duty involving such a heavy responsibility in its expenditures; and not to leave the command to fluctuate, as general officers of the militia might be called into or retire from service. General Clinch was a brevet brigadier general, and therefore liable to be superseded by a major general of the militia.

But there was a still stronger reason for this measure. It will be recollected that the disaster which befel Maj. Dade, and the exposed condition of Florida, painfully excited the public mind, particularly in the southern States. Spontaneous movements were made in that quarter for raising troops, and the patriotism of the country called into service many corps, before the state of affairs could be known at Washington. The Government was required by public opinion, as well as by the higher obligation of duty, to take the most immediate and efficient measures for the suppression of hostilities. Gen. Clinch was isolated in the heart of Florida. In fact his true position was necessarily unknown, for events were every moment changing, and the aspect of affairs becoming worse. His communications might at any moment have been intercepted, himself remain ignorant of the measures of the Government, and they of his situation and designs. Gen. Scott was in Washington. No time would be lost in giving him the necessary instructions, and his route would lead him through South Carolina and Georgia, whence most of the force had to be drawn. While a despatch was travelling to General Clinch, General Scott could be in the southern country, organizing his force and plans. And besides, such a despatch might have failed or been intercepted, and then in what condition would the country have been? and to what just censure would the Government have been exposed? And even should the necessary authority reach Gen. Clinch, much time must be lost in returning upon the route with his communications. He could not leave his command; affairs were too critical. And it must be obvious that the arrangements for such a campaign as was contemplated, could not be made without the presence and personal co-operation of the officer destined to command. The remedy for all this was obvious. And was the Government to be deterred from adopting it, because Gen. Clinch might choose to consider it a reflection upon him? There were much higher considerations involved in this affair than General Clinch seems to appreciate. He never had the slightest reason to consider himself injured. A just sensitiveness is an honorable feeling in a military man; but if carried too far, it degenerates into mortified vanity. All Governments have at all times assumed and exercised the right of changing their commanding officers at pleasure; and especially so when the sphere of operations is enlarged. I trust I have said enough to show that this measure was not intended to cast, nor did it cast, the slightest reflection upon General Clinch. As to the selection of a successor, with every just allowance for General Clinch, it may be safely said that he had won his way to this command by high and honorable services.

With respect to the return of Gen. Clinch's commission, I have only to say, that I proposed the measure to the President, by whom it was cordially approved; as was also the assignment of General Scott to the command.

I see that Gen. Scott, in his defence, appreciates the excited feelings of Gen. Clinch, and finds it necessary to discredit one of the answers of the latter, and to trace his erroneous judgment to the species of hallucination under which he appears to labor. It seems that General Clinch has been asked, whether the operations of Gen. Gaines had interfered with the projects and arrangements of Gen. Scott. The answer of Gen. Clinch was in the negative, and the solution of this answer by Gen. Scott is given in the following remark, in the defence of the latter: "Under this ruling idea, the witness, General Clinch, could see nothing but the imputed errors of the War Department." Indeed! and is this the judgment of Gen. Scott upon the state of mind of the principal witness who appears to arraign the proceedings of the Executive? I need not add to this rebuke: far more severe than any thing I have said, or desire to say.

General Scott likewise adds his conviction that "the repeated calls and wise admonitions" of General Clinch were neglected. This point I shall examine by and by; and if it is not shown that the precautions taken to prevent the commission of hostilities by the Seminoles were greater than have ever been adopted, when the strength of the enemy is taken into view, since the discovery of the continent, I will confess that I have read our history to little purpose.

One act of voluntary justice Gen. Scott has done to the War Department; and I appreciate it the more, as it stands out in solitary relief. He says, "I do not mean to intimate, Mr. President, that any time was lost by

the War Department in putting me in motion, after the news of Clinch's affair of December 31, which preceded at Washington the account of Major Dade's melancholy fate on the 28th." And yet the concession is not much to make. The slightest attention to the dates, as recorded in the Adjutant General's report of February 9, 1836, published by order of Congress, will show that the action of the Department was not less prompt upon that occasion than upon all others.

Unofficial information of Gen. Clinch's action reached Washington on the 17th of January; and on the same day a plan of operations was devised, and the necessary instructions given to Gen. Eustis for its execution, to provide, as far as seemed necessary, for the vigorous prosecution of the war. The measures will be stated in the sequel. But three days later, to wit, on the 20th, reports were received that the Creeks meditated hostilities; and it was therefore deemed necessary, as already stated, to enlarge the sphere of operations, and to call Gen. Scott to the command; and this was done, and detailed instructions prepared and delivered to General Scott on the next day. So much for the General's willingness to spare any intimation of an unnecessary delay upon this occasion. If it were necessary to allude to the matter at all, would it not have been more just, more noble, more in consonance, I may add, with the character of General Scott, for him to have said, plainly and explicitly, that never were more prompt or decisive measures taken than upon that occasion—measures, whose discussion and consideration, as Gen. Scott must well remember, extended far into the night, and broke upon his rest, as well as upon mine?

Rumors of Indian disturbances are matters of frequent occurrence. Sometimes these have been followed by hostilities, but more frequently they have proved unfounded. It is obviously impracticable to keep a superior force to the Indians upon every point of our extended and exposed frontier; and were troops collected upon every rumor, the country would be subjected to enormous expense, and the army and militia to perpetual fatigue. It is the duty of Government, then, to act prudently, as well as promptly, upon these occasions; and while efficient measures are adopted where they appear necessary, to withhold them where they do not, and to preserve in these measures a just proportion to the strength of the Indians, and the probability of their hostile designs.

What was the amount of the white population of Florida in 1835 I have not the means of ascertaining. I suppose, however, that it exceeded 30,000. It is necessary to keep this fact in view while looking at the course of events; because each part of our frontier must be expected to supply a considerable proportion of the force at any time required to repel sudden aggression of the Indians. If I have made a reasonable approximation towards the population of Florida, it will be found that no one has ever estimated the whole number of the Seminoles at more than one-sixth of this population, and that the official reports in the archives of the department reduced them to one-tenth. There was then near the theatre of difficulties a permanent force, ready to aid the efforts of the army, and amply sufficient, agreeably to all preceding experience, to restrain or subdue the Indians. Let me ask the frontier inhabitants of the West, from one end of the great valley of the Mississippi to the other—those who are now in contact with the Indians, and those who have purchased security, by years of wars and sufferings—whether they do not think the Government would at all times have discharged its duties towards them, by making arrangements for more than one regular soldier for each warrior within striking distance, and among a white population outnumbering the Indians at least six to one, and probably ten to one? and yet this was done in Florida. Our settlements would never have crossed the Alleghany, if our forefathers had found it necessary to prosecute Indian wars upon a larger scale than this.

A treaty had been formed with the Seminole Indians, providing for their removal west of the Mississippi; and from the time which had elapsed, and the reluctance manifested by the Indians to remove,

it had become necessary to take measures for carrying the treaty into effect. But all the difficulties anticipated with this tribe, were expected to result from the contemplated movement; and no one looked to hostile demonstrations on the part of the Indians, until and unless they were required to emigrate. I doubt whether there was scarcely a person in Florida who was prepared to hear of any hostile movement by these Indians, before the arrival of the period fixed for their departure. Gov. Eaton distinctly stated in a letter to me, that their hostilities were entirely unexpected at that time by the people of Florida; and he informed me that the same sentiment had been communicated to the department by the Secretary of the Territory. The whole correspondence of General Clinch, until a very short period preceding the commencement of actual hostilities, indicates the same opinion. I mention the circumstance to show that the Government had a right to suppose that Gen. Clinch had ample time to collect all his force, and to anticipate the Indians, should he become satisfied of their hostile designs.

An important element in this inquiry is the amount of the Seminole population. Captain Thruston, I observe, estimates them in his testimony at 5,000, and I have never heard a higher estimate put upon their numbers. Lieut. Harris, a very intelligent officer, charged with the duty of providing and distributing the articles stipulated by the treaty to be given to the Indians, and well acquainted with them, estimated them in a report to the War Department as not exceeding 3,000, including negroes, of which 1,600 were females. This was the latest report upon the subject, and derived value from the fact, that as certain articles were to be distributed to each Seminole, and as Lieutenant Harris had this duty to perform, it was obviously proper for him to use his best exertions to ascertain the full number, in order to avoid all complaints at the distribution, as it was as obviously the policy of these Indians not to diminish in their report their actual number.

Gen. Thompson, the Indian agent, a most respectable citizen and valuable officer, known to many as a representative in Congress from Georgia, in a letter to the Commissary General of Subsistence, of August 29, 1835, says: "I have resorted to all practicable means of information to ascertain, with a probable approach to precision, the actual number of the Seminole people, and I am induced to believe it very little exceeds 3,000."

General Scott, in one of his reports, after his campaign, stated that there had never been 500 Indian warriors collected together at one time, in Florida. I quote from memory, but I cannot be deceived in the fact. The President supposed their whole force did not exceed 500. Previous circumstances had given to him very favorable opportunities of forming a correct opinion upon this subject. It will also be recollected, that no one expected the whole of the Indian force would be opposed to us. A considerable party was desirous of emigrating; and it has often, perhaps I may say almost always, happened, in our later Indian wars, that, on the occurrence of hostilities with any of the tribes within our borders, a division of the tribe has taken place, and the seceding party has either remained neutral or joined us; and in the case of the Seminoles, a band, I think, of about 500, left their people at the commencement of hostilities, and placed themselves within our lines.

In the report, already alluded to, of the Adjutant General, is embodied a report from the Commissioner of Indian affairs upon this subject; in which he states, that assuming the estimate of Lieut. Harris as correct, and supposing the Seminoles equally divided on the question of emigration, there would be 700 Seminole males, children, and adults, forming the hostile party. He supposes that not more than one half of this, to wit, 350 persons, were fit to bear arms; but he adds, that this hostile party may have received accessions from

the other party, and also from the Creeks. I believe it has been found that few, if any, of the Creeks joined the Seminoles.

Under all these circumstances, I thought then, and I yet think, that the estimate of 500 hostile warriors was sufficiently high. I do not answer for the accuracy of this information. I am only answerable for the use which was made of it. It formed the only basis upon which the Government could act. I may add, what is known to all any way conversant with the Indians, that their numbers are generally overrated rather than underrated; and that in almost all the actions we have fought with them, subsequent information has reduced the estimate of the numbers originally given upon vague calculation.

It will be observed, that there were two periods in the progress of the Seminole difficulties anterior to the commencement of actual hostilities: one between the origin of these difficulties, and the pacification, if I may so term it, made by Gen. Clinch, Gen. Thompson, and Lieut. Harris with these Indians, in April, 1835, when a mutual and apparently satisfactory arrangement was made with them, by which they agreed to remove during the succeeding winter, and the Government agreed that they might remain till then. The second period intervened between this time and the breaking out of the war.

It is necessary to keep in view the change of circumstances induced by this arrangement, though Gen. Clinch has overlooked it in his evidence, as he refers, in proof of the charge he makes of the negligence of the Government, to his letter of January, 1835, in which he asked for six additional companies. Now, the state of things existing when this application was made, and subsequent to the above mentioned arrangement, was totally different; and General Clinch is wrong to refer to it as any step in the series of measures having relation to actual hostilities. The force in Florida in the spring of 1835 was found, by experience, to be enough. It accomplished its object, and led to a mutual arrangement. A person looking at the presentation of this letter, with the others by General Clinch, would suppose that it constituted one of a series of demands made by him, and rejected by the Government. He would never dream that it had a relation to a state of things which was terminated peacefully and successfully; and after which the force under General Clinch was, for some months, judged sufficient by him for the protection of the country. While General Clinch supposed the Indians altogether unfavorable to a removal, he estimated the necessary force to control them at twelve companies; but when they had consented to go voluntarily, he considered a less force necessary, as I shall show conclusively by his letters and proceedings.

In November, 1834, on the receipt of the first authentic intelligence that difficulties might possibly occur with the Seminoles, Gen. Clinch, an officer of experience and of much reputation, was directed to assume the command in Florida, and the necessary instructions were given him for his government.

In January, 1835, General Clinch asked for six additional companies to strengthen his command, with a view to the removal of the Seminole Indians "in the spring," say in April or May of that year. His demand was submitted to the President, who decided that four companies should be sent to Florida from Fort Monroe, and that Gen. Clinch should be authorized to order the company at Key West to join him whenever he might think proper. Orders for these purposes were given on the 14th of February, 1835. I will not enter into a consideration of the views which operated to place five, instead of six, companies at the disposal of General Clinch. It may have been error of judgment; but most assuredly neglect, as intimated by himself, and repeated by General Scott, had no part in the matter. When the estimated force of the Indians is taken into view, the just desire of circumscribing the expense as far as prudent, and the material fact that, by the treaty, only about one-third of the Seminoles could be required to remove that

"spring" (say short of two hundred disaffected warriors,) the decision of the President will be thought a discreet one. But there is still better authority, if possible, upon this occasion, in justification of the measures adopted by the Government. It is the authority of Gen. Clinch himself. He asked, as the maximum of force which could be wanted, eleven companies, or five hundred and fifty men. He received nine companies, or four hundred and fifty men; and he received, also, power to order the company from Key West to join him, which would make ten companies, or five hundred men. I state what I suppose to be about the average of the companies. Whether more or less is not important for my present purpose, which is to repel the accusation of having neglected General Clinch's requisitions. These requisitions were for companies.

Well, then, the force sent to General Clinch carried him through the spring. He made an arrangement with the Indians, which appeared to be satisfactory to them, and was so to the Government, and which quieted the frontier, and induced the general belief that this troublesome matter was over. His force was found sufficient, because his purpose was effected.

But General Clinch himself considered a less force than that he named, and even a less force than that placed at his disposal by the Government, adequate to the objects he had to attain. He did not call to his aid the company from Key West; and it is very important in this inquiry to remark, that while General Clinch now accuses the Government of neglecting his application for a proper force, during that whole season the company at Key West, placed under his command the preceding February, almost in sight of Florida, and not more than one day's sail from its shore, was left by him upon that island, and never reached the sphere of his command till the 21st of December. The order authorising Gen. Clinch to call it to his aid, must have reached him the beginning of March. During nine months, then, deducting the few days necessary to communicate his orders to Maj. Dade, and for that officer to cross over to the main land of Florida, General Clinch considered his force sufficient, or he was guilty of that neglect which he now charges, and, as I trust I have shown, vainly charges to the Government.

And what stronger proof can be given of that assertion already made, that the hostile movements of the Indians was unexpected by him, who, of all others, was charged with watching and restraining them, than this failure to employ, for that purpose, all the force placed at his disposal.

But still farther: General Clinch, in his letter to the War Department, of April 1, 1835, after stating his belief that an arrangement would be made which would quiet the Indians, and be satisfactory to the Government, says that, "should the chiefs come to the conclusion to remove quietly, it would be still necessary to keep the present force in Florida." The chiefs did consent to remove quietly, as has been already shown, and the then "present force" was kept in Florida; and nothing more did General Clinch then demand. In all this, is there any evidence of neglect? I leave the question to the great tribunal of public opinion.

So passed the whole period of the Seminole difficulties. I will merely add, upon this branch of the subject, that Gen. Thompson, in a letter of June 3, 1835, some time after the conclusion of the arrangement, reported that Powell had assented to it, and that he had "no doubt of his sincerity, and as little that the principal difficulty is surmounted."

Thus matters remained till the fall, without any intimation from Gen. Clinch that an additional force would be necessary. The first suggestion of this nature was made on the 12th of October, by Lieut. Harris, I think in a personal interview at the War Department. But as Gen. Clinch had not asked for the increase, it was not judged proper positively to direct it. But he was authorised to call for two more companies; one from Pensacola and one from Mobile, if he thought them necessary; and orders were issued to the commanding officers of those companies to hold themselves in readiness for an immediate movement.

On the 21st of October, a letter was received from Gen. Clinch, dated on the 9th of that month, "in which he suggested the propriety of being authorised to call into service 156 mounted volunteers, to aid in the removal of the Indians, and to suppress any difficulty which might

occur." (See the report of the Adjutant General of February 9, 1836.) This report thus states the result:

"But as this force was required to aid in the removal, and to prevent difficulties which were anticipated, and not to repel hostilities which had commenced, or which were then impending, Gen. Clinch was informed in answer, on the 22d of October, that there was no appropriation authorizing the measure, and that the President, under existing circumstances, did not consider that the case came under the constitutional power to call into service additional force for the defence of the country."

This was the view of the President respecting his own powers. I am neither responsible for it, nor called upon to defend it. I imagine, however, that every dispassionate man who looks at the facts as they were then known at the seat of Government, and at the constitutional powers of the President, will fully approve his decision.

The report of the Adjutant General continues:

"But he (Gen. Clinch,) was authorized to order two more companies, viz: those at Forts Wood and Pike to join, which, with the two companies placed at his disposal on the 15th of October, made four companies of regular troops, in lieu of the mounted men. On the 30th of the same month, orders were given by the Navy Department to Commodore Dallas, to direct one of the vessels of the squadron to co-operate with Gen. Clinch in his endeavors to effect the removal of the Seminoles.

"In a letter received on the 31st of October, General Clinch requested that three companies of regular troops might be added to his command. He was apprised, however, by previous orders, that four had already been placed at his disposal."

Gen. Clinch has complained that these troops ought to have been sent from the north, rather than from the points whence they were ordered. This was a question for the proper military officers of the Department at Washington to decide, having reference to the wants of the service and the position of the troops. The subject was referred to them, and the selection was made of the companies enumerated. One leading reason is obvious. There was still ground to hope that coercive measures might not be necessary. It was, therefore, thought better to place these additional troops under the orders of Gen. Clinch, at the nearest points to Florida, where they could remain, if not wanted, or whence he could speedily draw them, when necessary, than to order them positively into the country from a great distance. As to the delay in their arrival, I neither know any thing of the cause nor feel the slightest responsibility. There was a fault or misfortune somewhere, not in giving the necessary directions, but in their subsequent execution. It is not necessary, for my purpose, to inquire where it was. Most assuredly, had proper diligence been used, the companies from Pensacola, Mobile, Lake Ponchartrain, and they best, could have reached Tampa Bay, before the periods of their actual arrival, as shown in the report of the Adjutant General to wit: the 27th of November, and the 12th, 25th, 23th, and 31st of December. And it appears conclusively that this delay did not originate in the want of time, for the Key West company, which might have been called into Florida nine months before, did not reach there till the 21st of December, nearly a month after the Pensacola company, which was only placed at Gen. Clinch's disposal on the 15th of October.

The last measures directed by the Government before the commencement of actual hostilities, are stated in the same report.

"In his communication from St. Augustine, dated the 29th of November, received on the 9th of December, Gen. Clinch reported that, should he find it necessary for the protection of the frontier settlements, he would assume the responsibility of calling out at least 100 mounted men, believing that the measure would be sanctioned by the President and the Secretary of War. This approbation was communicated to him on the same day; and, in addition to it, a letter was addressed to the Governor of Florida, requesting him to place at the disposal of Gen. Clinch any militia force which that officer might require. Of this, Gen. Clinch was informed. He was also informed that, at the request of Gen. Hernandez, orders would be given, through the Ordnance Department, to issue 500 muskets, and the necessary accoutrements, to the militia."

Here terminated all the demands of Gen. Clinch for troops, prior to the commencement of hostilities; with this exception, however, that, on the 9th of December, he suggested the expediency of substituting four com-

panies from the north instead of the four ordered from the south, as the latter might not reach the country. But, at the moment when the letter was written, one of these companies had already been two weeks at Tampa Bay, and all of them were there before the letter reached the War Department. So that the suggestion was evidently impracticable.

Now let us slightly review this matter. I pass over the first period in order not to encumber the subject, and because an arrangement was made which for some time seemed to promise permanent tranquillity.

General Clinch had eight companies with him, and one more within his reach; and these, as has been shown, he deemed sufficient. His next demand was for three more companies, and this was succeeded and met by giving him four. He asked for 150 mounted men, but the President did not feel authorized, in the then state of affairs, to call for them. He then subsequently stated he should ask the Governor of Florida for 100 men, if he should find it necessary for the protection of the frontiers. The President, believing that circumstances were then sufficiently menacing to justify this measure, gave his sanction to it; and in addition, without any demand from General Clinch, he placed the whole militia of the Territory, through the Governor, at his disposal.

Now, as a matter of fact, General Clinch had a far greater force under his command than he ever required. I do not mean that he had collected them together; with that I have no concern. I have only to show that proper measures for that purpose were taken by the War Department. And I have shown that these measures ought to have given to General Clinch the full complement of regular troops he asked for. In addition to which he embodied 500 militia; and that force was with him, as stated by the Adjutant General, at the battle of the Withlacoochie, on the 31st of December, 1835. Why it was not in the engagement has never been satisfactorily explained. I believe Gen. Clinch's personal conduct on that day was beyond all reproach, and never was the honor of the American arms more nobly supported, than by the regular troops. But this most favorable opportunity of terminating the war, by striking a decisive stroke was lost. The combat was sustained by about 200 regular troops, aided, it is said, by twenty-five or thirty militia. And why was not the whole force in action? A narrow stream like the Withlacoochie ought not to have prevented American riflemen from crossing upon logs—upon rafts—by swimming their horses—to take part in the struggle, unequally but gallantly maintained by their countrymen within full sight. More especially as there could be no danger from the enemy in crossing, the regular troops covering the banks of the river. If I recollect correctly, the regulars crossed early, and it was some time after their passage before the action commenced; the duration of the action I have not the means of ascertaining. The enemy was repulsed by 200 men: Who can doubt but that there was force enough, had it been properly directed and employed, to terminate the war at once? If these 500 spectators had been brought into action, and the enemy broken and pursued by the horsemen, the victory might have been as decisive as any of those gained under happier auspices in the same section of the Union. If these troops were prevented by insurmountable obstacles from participating in the contest, Gen. Clinch owed to them a full development of the circumstances. If they were prevented by any less justifiable cause, Gen. Clinch owed to himself, to the regular troops, to justice, and to his country, a plain and unequivocal disclosure of the truth, bear where it might.

So much for the year 1835. But Gen. Clinch extends his charge against the War Department to the year 1836, and continues his accusation of neglect, asserting that a competent force and competent supplies were not provided "early" in that year.

I suppose it will be conceded that the 8th of January may be fairly said to be "early" in 1836. Well, then, on the 8th of January, authority was given to Gen. Clinch to call for any amount of force he might require, from the States of South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama; and this measure was taken upon the responsibility of the Department, and without any application from that officer, and the necessary requests were transmitted to the Executives of these States. And on the 10th and 13th of the same month, upon the suggestion of the War Department, orders were given

for the employment of three revenue cutters, and for the co-operation of Commodore Dallas's squadron.

I suppose the 17th of January was "early" in the year 1836. Well, then, upon the 17th of January, fearing from the intelligence, which every day became worse, that the communication with General Clinch might be intercepted, and he thus prevented from executing the orders of the Government, General Eustis, then at Charleston, was directed to proceed to Florida, and to take all necessary measures to keep open the communication with Gen. Clinch, and to report to him for further instructions. Gen. Eustis was directed to take with him the garrisons at Charleston and Savannah, and such a portion of the South Carolina militia as he might deem necessary. And the Governor of that State was requested to supply him with the force.

I suppose again, that the 21st of January, 1836, was "early" in that year. Well, then, on the previous day, the first intimation reached the Department of the unquiet disposition of the Creeks, and of the probability of their joining the Seminoles. It instantly became apparent that much more extensive operations might become necessary than had been contemplated. It was immediately determined to adapt the measures to be taken to this new state of things; and General Scott, with ample powers, was, on the 21st, ordered to take the command in that quarter. It is enough to repeat, that he had unlimited means placed at his disposal.

I confine myself to the measures taken for the employment of the proper force. This is all for which I feel the slightest responsibility. When a force is directed to any point, the proper military bureaux of the War Department make arrangements with or without the conjunction of the officer commanding, for all the *materiel* which can be required. And that officer has, besides, the right to make his requisitions, and, if necessary, to make purchases for every thing he needs. These are details into which no head of the War Department can have time to enter, and it is precisely for their execution that the military bureaux are instituted. The Adjutant General states, in the report before mentioned: "I have not considered it necessary to detail in this report the orders given by the various military bureaux of the War Department, to provide the necessary means, such as transportation, ordnance stores, and provisions for the operations in Florida. All the measures in relation to these subjects, which appeared to be necessary, were duly taken."

I do not recollect ever to have heard it intimated that Gen. Clinch's operations were crippled for the want of any supplies for the force placed at his disposal by the Government. Certainly, if such had been the case, he ought to have represented it, that the proper inquiries might have been instituted, and an adequate remedy applied. Without the Adjutant Gen's report, it might have been taken for granted, from the absence of all complaint by Gen. Clinch, that there was no failure in the measures of the military bureaux at Washington to proportion his supplies to his force; but the report of that faithful and accurate officer sets the subject at rest.

I feel I violate no confidence in saying, that there was not a report received of the operations in Florida, from the first apprehension of difficulties, which was not submitted to the President; nor a measure of any importance taken, which was not approved by him. It is well known, that from the practice and organization of our Government, the heads of departments are in daily communication with the President, and that all questions of much interest are discussed with him; and to those who know the habits of rigid scrutiny which General Jackson carried with him into public life, I need not say, that no question could be presented to him which he did not carefully and fully consider. In the examination of papers, he was remarkable for the most patient attention; and I will say of him now, in his day of retirement, what I would

not have thus publicly said of him in the day of his power, that never have I known a man who brought to every subject quicker powers of perception, nor a more intuitive sagacity.

I do not resort to this authority to shield myself from responsibility under the constitutional prerogative of the President. I feel and acknowledge my own responsibility to the fullest extent, and am prepared to meet it. The measures directed by me became my measures, whether approved or not by the President; but I confess, that the opinion of Andrew Jackson upon these subjects is interesting to me. I need not advert to the reasons which give peculiar value to his views concerning the operations in Florida; to his intimate knowledge of the country and of the Indians, acquired during years of service there, in a military and civil capacity; and to those personal claims to consideration, which will be as undying as the history of our country.

With these reflections and statements, I leave the charge of Gen. Clinch to the judgment of the American people. If they think that the incapacity, or misfortunes or dissensions of military commanders are to be visited upon my head, I have only to submit, with as much resignation as may be. But I hope better things from the impartiality of my countrymen. I have received, during a public life of more than thirty years, many favors I neither expected nor merited. I am encouraged to hope that when I ask only rigid justice, I shall not be found a vain suppliant.

LEW. CASS.

PARIS, *March 6, 1837.*

FOREIGN MISCELLANY.

MANNING THE RUSSIAN NAVY.—To every Russian ship of the line a regiment, or "equipage," as they term it, is assigned: it is composed of 1100 officers and privates, and suffices to man not only the larger vessel, but the smaller ones attached to her, agreeably to the following scale:—To a three-decker, a corvette or sloop; to a vessel of 84 guns, two brigs; and to a 74-gun ship, a frigate. In this way the seamen that man the fleet in the Baltic amount to not less than 30,800, and those that man the fleet in the Black Sea to 19,800; making altogether upwards of 50,000 men. The various divisions of the fleet are distinguished by blue, white, and red flags; but the colour of the flag does not designate the rank of the Admiral in command, as in our own service. The corps of officers is recruited from the two Cadet Academies; that at St. Petersburg, which consists of 600 pupils, supplies officers for regular duty, while the other, which contains from 100 to 200 pupils, furnishes Masters for the ships. The whole of the cadets are embarked on board of the fleet every year, and sent to sea. The annual expense of the Russian Navy is 28,000,000 of roubles (about 1,280,000*l.* sterling) for the Baltic fleet, and 16,000,000 of roubles (about 730,000*l.*) for that in the Black Sea, forming a total of 2,010,000*l.* With regard to the building of their ships, the Russians have merely followed the model set them by American, French, and English builders; and with this avail themselves rapidly of any inventions or improvements made in other countries.—There are scarcely any two ships alike in all the navy, although the shipwrights and builders have mostly received their education in English yards. The Russia, a vessel intended to carry 120 guns, is now in course of construction in the yard at St. Petersburg, and being built with the best oak which the country affords, is calculated to last from twelve to fifteen years; but in general most of the Russian ships of war become unserviceable at the end of nine or ten.

THE ART OF WAR—Baron de Jomini, Aide-de-Camp General to the Emperor, has just published a new edition, (being the fourth) of his "*Précis de*

l'Art de la Guerre," a work affording an analytical view of the principal combinations in war, and their relation to state politics. The first edition, published about six years ago, has been translated into several languages, and was reprinted both at Paris and Brussels. A number of valuable and important additions, as well as emendations, have been made by the author to the present edition, which therefore forms a still more useful introduction than the former one to his "Treatise on Military Operations on a large scale." This fourth edition is printed at the expense of the Russian Government, and the Emperor has directed that it shall be used as a text-book for the strategical studies of the heir-apparent. It is a thick octavo, and contains three plans; the price about eight shillings.

MAXIMILIAN TOWERS.—Some time ago we noticed an experiment in fortification which had been made at Lintz, by the erecting of round towers as its defences. The experiment, set on foot at the instigation of the Archduke Maximilian, appears to have failed altogether, for, on a recent occasion, heavy artillery having been brought against the towers in the presence of several officers of distinction, the firing, in spite of the imperfect manner in which the guns were served, completely demolished the first tower that was assailed.

EMPLOYMENT OF THE BRITISH NAVY.—The scientific surveys of our coasts, under Captains Hewitt, Mudge, and other able officers, are rapidly progressing, and their execution is creditable to the country. Captain Vidal is exploring the coast of Africa, from Korisco Bay to the Sherboro' River—a portion almost unknown to hydrography, though so long the very haunt of the slavers. The persevering Back has returned to the scene of his Arctic adventures, having commissioned the Terror, to complete the discovery of the southern shores of Boothia, from the Straits of the Fury and Hecla to the mouth of the Great Fish River; he was seen on the 1st of August, in Hudson's Strait, on his way to Wager River, on the western shore of Sir Thomas Rowe's Welcome. Captain Fitzroy, who left England in the Beagle in 1831, has just returned from a scientific voyage round the globe; he has successively visited the coasts of South America, the Gallipagos, Tahiti, Tongabato, New Zealand, Sydney, King George's Sound, Keeling's Island, Mauritius, the Cape of Good Hope, and other points: between these, he has measured meridian distances by means of no fewer than eighteen excellent chronometers, whose rates were ultimately brought up to Greenwich; besides which, other observations, of a most interesting and valuable nature, especially in natural history, under the able direction of Mr. Darwin, have been made, in a manner reflecting the highest credit on the voyage.

The skill, spirit, and perseverance of British seamen under adverse circumstances, have again been proved in the search made by the younger Ross to aid and rescue the frozen-up whalers; and it affords us much satisfaction to offer to the public a narrative, of which the first portion appears in our present number, of this enterprising expedition. The coolness and activity of the same class, amidst a terrible conflict of the elements, has been exhibited by Captain Quinn and the officers and crew of the Raleigh; which ship, being struck by a heavy weather-wave during a typhoon in the China Sea, was literally thrown upon her beam ends, with her keel out, and her tops buried under water. Yet in this awful and hopeless state, instead of abandoning themselves to despair, the people most gallantly got on her broadside, and by speedily cutting away the lanyards of the lower rigging and backstays, sent the masts and bowsprit away by the board, and righted her. Thus a vessel, which already seemed a doomed one, was saved to his Majesty, by a happy and instant exer-

tion of prudence, zeal, and professional knowledge. In similar terms of praise must we allude to the truly "United Service" expedition to the Euphrates; for the exemplary obedience of all on board Lieutenant Lynch's vessel, the Tigris, when she so unfortunately foundered in a squall of wind and sand on the 21st of May last, was most admirable: "Scarcely a word was spoken," says Colonel Chesney, "not a murmur was heard, and death was met with an exemplary degree of intrepidity and resignation."

The serious and lamentable losses in our mercantile marine are at length arousing attention in the proper quarters. We have frequently directed our readers to the subject, particularly in a recent attempt to show the nature and operation of marine insurance upon the equipment, freighting, and conduct of merchantmen. Since the publication of our remarks, the Report of the Committee upon Shipwrecks has been printed, in which we find the subject is about to be interfered with by the Legislature; and it is to be hoped that steps may be adopted which will place our commercial navy in a more efficient and respectable light than that which it has latterly occupied.

Sir William Symonds and Capt. Hayes have again exerted their powers of naval construction, and the emulation of the Pique and the Inconstant has formed a ripe topic among the naval circles; the opinions at present are somewhat discordant, but we understand that a most correct report of the sailing trials, with appropriate diagrams, will shortly appear. The subject is one of increasing interest, and we have endeavoured to arouse attention to it by proposing the foundation of a society expressly to consider the means and suggestions for naval improvement. Something of this nature seems to be the more necessary, since the announcement of the projected demolition of the Naval College, and the School of Naval Architecture—*United Service Journal*.

Extract from a letter from an officer on board the Mediterranean squadron, to his friend in Washington, dated

"MAHON, Feb. 15, 1837.

"Com. ELLIOTT has received a pressing invitation from the Sultan, through Com. PORTER, to visit Constantinople the ensuing summer. A fine ship of the line, which has been so long promised and expected, would be a noble conveyance for us in an expedition like this. But the fame of old Ironsides, with the General on her bows, will make up for a deficiency in metal or timber. The Sultan, wishing to inspect the whole detail of a first rate man of war, will visit the Constitution on her arrival at Constantinople. This was done by Ibrahim Pacha, while we were upon the coast of Syria last summer. On one occasion, his Highness was dining on board, and being a little in his cups, he made each of us fill, and with bumpers, all standing, he drank to the health of Gen. Jackson, at the same time facing his portrait. At Alexandria, Mahomet Ali made us a similar visit; and I judge it was from their representations that the Sultan has been induced to invite us to Constantinople, that he also may pay us a visit."—*Globe*.

From the Buenos Ayres British Packet, Jan. 14.

SHIP ERIE, COMMODORE JAMES RENSHAW.—The Erie left us on Saturday last. Her frequent visits to Buenos Ayres (this being we believe the sixth,) will have enabled her officers to form a tolerably accurate idea of the Buenos Ayres residents, both native and foreign. We had the happiness to be acquainted with most of the Erie's officers, and cannot let this opportunity pass without thanking them for the many kind attentions with which they honored us. We can assure them that their unassuming and amiable manners have gained for them numerous friends in Buenos Ayres. We shall ever think of the Erie's with respect and esteem.

WASHINGTON CITY ;
THURSDAY, APRIL 20, 1837.

As our Agent in Philadelphia, (H. M. Prevost, 47 South Third Street,) has not time to call upon our subscribers in that city, they would confer a special favor by paying the amount of their subscriptions to him, or by remitting to us direct, as may best suit them.

Subscribers, generally, are reminded of the great importance of prompt payments.

Major General GAINES left Baltimore on Friday morning, in the steam boat line for Philadelphia. He proceeds as far east as New-Haven, where he has a son at Yale College. On his return, he will proceed to Mobile, at which place he will establish the head quarters of the Western Department.

The Board for the examination of Midshipmen, ordered to assemble at Baltimore, on Monday the 22d day of May next, will be composed of Commodores James Biddle, and M. T. Woolsey, Captains George C. Read, Joseph J. Nicholson, and David Conner.

The mathematical examiners are E. C. Ward and P. J. Rodriguez.

Commodore RODGERS will leave Washington in a few days, with the view of taking a voyage, probably to Europe, for the benefit of his health. Commodore R. is the senior officer of our navy, and has been on active duty upwards of a quarter of a century. This long period of faithful service, in addition to his advanced age, gives him strong claims to the indulgence of a temporary respite.

Commodore WARRINGTON, of the U. S. Navy, visited the French frigates Sirene and Andromede, lying in Hampton Roads, on Friday last, on which occasion a salute was fired from each ship.

The frigate Sirene, Admiral DUPORTET, for Brest, and Andromede, Capt. VILLENEUVE, for Rio de Janeiro, sailed from Hampton Roads on Saturday.

Lieut. J. T. SPRAGUE, of the Marine Corps, left Washington a short time since for Chicago, Illinois, on Indian emigrating service.

FORAGE AND VEGETABLES.—In a recent number of the *Courrier des Etats Unis*, published at New York, we find on account of the proceedings of the French Academy of Sciences. Among other subjects treated of, is that of Rural Economy, embracing the difference in the nutritious properties of different kinds of forage. The French view every subject in a scientific light, and as this is one which is interesting to our Dragoons, as well as all officers whose duties require them to be mounted, we have thought that a translation of it (such as we can make, for want of a better) would be acceptable.

M. Boussingault presented his researches upon the quantity of azote contained in forage, and upon their equivalents.

For a long time the most distinguished agriculturists of Germany and England have sought to establish the value of the nutritious properties of forage, and given as the result of their experience, the numbers which express the value in weights, in which the different species can be substituted, one for another. These numbers are the true equivalents; they indicate for example, that such a quantity of hay, or of roots, can be replaced by another like quantity of leaves or of grain, to nourish equally a fattening ox or a laboring horse.

They are aware that it is very difficult to appreciate with exactness the effect, favorable or injurious, which produces a change of the alimentary regimen; it is in consequence of this, that we perceive such a difference of opinion among the equivalents given by different authors.

M. Boussingault has thought that he could obtain a more precise measure of the nutritive qualities of different forage, in ascertaining the azote which they contain. We cannot enter here into the considerations, by which he supports this point of view, nor even into the detail of his processes of analysis; and we content ourselves with presenting the results at which he has arrived. He recapitulates them himself in the following table, where he attempts to reconcile the theoretical acquirements obtained by this means, with the practical equivalents, at which the agriculturists, as we have said above, have arrived.

SUBSTANCES.	Water lost in drying at 100°.	Azote in the substance dried.	Azote in the substance not dried.	Theoretical Equivalents.	Practical Equivalents.
Ordinary hay,	0,112	0,1118	0,0104	100	100
Red clover in flower,	0,166	0,1217	0,0176	60	90
Green clover,	"	0,0060	0,0050	208	"
Lucerne,	0,166	0,0166	0,0138	75	90
Green Lucerne,	"	"	0,0030	347	"
Leaves of dried vetch,	0,110	0,0157	0,0141	74	83
Wheat straw,	0,193	0,0030	0,0020	520	400
Rye straw,	0,122	0,0020	0,0017	611	400
Oat straw,	0,210	0,0036	0,0019	547	400
Barley straw,	0,110	0,0026	0,0020	520	400
Potatoes,	0,923	0,0180	0,0037	281	200
Topinambours,*	0,755	0,0220	0,0042	248	205
Head cabbages,	0,923	0,0370	0,0028	371	429
Carrots,	0,876	0,0240	0,0030	347	319
Red Beets,	0,905	0,0270	0,0026	400	397
Turnips,	0,918	0,0220	0,0017	612	607
Beans,	0,079	0,0550	0,0511	20	"
Yellow pease,	0,167	0,0408	0,0340	31	30
White kidney beans,	0,050	0,0430	0,0408	25	"
Lentilles,	0,090	0,0440	0,0400	26	"
Vetch, (chick-pea)	0,146	0,0513	0,0437	24	"
Rape-seed cakes,	0,105	0,0550	0,0492	21	"
Corn,	0,180	0,0200	0,0164	63	50
Backwheat,	0,125	0,0240	0,0210	50	"
Wheat,	0,105	0,0238	0,0213	49	27
Rye,	0,110	0,0229	0,0204	51	33
Barley,	0,132	0,0202	0,0176	59	54
Oats,	0,124	0,0222	0,0192	54	61
Wheat flour,	0,125	0,0260	0,0227	46	"
Barley flour,	0,130	0,0220	0,0190	55	"

* This is a species of potatoe, for which we can find no English translation; we therefore give the word in the original.

Among the substances which figure in the preceding table, there are some which are almost exclusively used for the nourishment of men. It might be useful, says M. Boussingault, to compare between themselves those different aliments which are there found, according to the quantities of azote which they respectively contain.

It is to facilitate this comparison, that the following table has been prepared. We have taken for the basis wheat flour, the equivalent of which is represented by 100. As the bulbs, roots and leaves may be reduced to powder when they are dried at a heat not exceeding 100°, these dried materials are designated under the name of flour.

SUBSTANCES.	EQUIVALENTS.
Wheat flour, - - - - -	100
Wheat, - - - - -	107
Barley flour, - - - - -	119
Barley, - - - - -	130
Rye, - - - - -	111
Buckwheat - - - - -	108
Corn, - - - - -	138
Beans, - - - - -	44
Yellow pease, - - - - -	67
White kidney beans, - - - - -	56
Lentilles, - - - - -	57
White head cabbage, - - - - -	810
Flour of lettuce, - - - - -	83
Potatoes, - - - - -	613
Potatoe flour, - - - - -	126
Carrots, - - - - -	757
Flour of carrots, - - - - -	95
Turnips, - - - - -	335

PROMOTIONS IN THE BRITISH NAVY AND ARMY.

—The United Service Journal for February contains the names of several individuals promoted on the 10th January last, amounting in the aggregate as follows:—

NAVY.

To be Admirals of the Red,	8
Admirals of the White,	14
Admirals of the Blue,	14
Vice Admirals of the Red,	19
Vice Admirals of the White,	20
Vice Admirals of the Blue,	20
Rear Admirals of the Red,	20
Rear Admirals of the White,	21
Rear Admirals of the Blue,	21
Rear Admirals on the Retired list,	36
Captains,	27
Commanders,	27
Lieutenants,	29

Total in the Navy, 277

ARMY BREVETS.

To be Generals,	42
Lieutenant Generals,	59
Major Generals,	65
Colonels,	149
Lieutenant Colonels,	116
Majors,	135

Total in the Army, 566

The Norfolk Beacon says, "The Exploring squadron lies beautifully off our harbor—their flags gallantly flying, and the broad pennant of Com. JONES, finely flowing from the mainmast head of the flag ship. The Macedonian has not yet come down from the yard, but may shortly be expected to join the party."

THE LATE LIEUT. JOSEPH CROSS, U. S. N.

The Legislatures of several of the States have, at various periods, voted swords, medals, and thanks, to their native sons, for gallantry and distinguished services.

The late Lieut. Joseph Cross, of the navy, was one of the individuals thus honored, and although he is no longer among the living, and the occasion has passed by, yet as we consider our journal an appropriate place to record such proceedings, we give them an insertion.

HOUSE OF DELEGATES, March 14th, 1827.

Resolved unanimously, That the General Assembly of Maryland entertain a high sense of the gallantry of JOSEPH CROSS, a native of this State, a Lieutenant in the Navy of the United States, and who participated in three brilliant and well fought actions during the late war, all of which terminated in glorious victory, viz: the action between the Constitution and Guerriere, the action between the Constitution and Java, and the action between the Constitution and Cyane and Levant, and is now an officer of high distinction on board the frigate Brandywine.

Resolved unanimously, That the Governor be, and he is hereby authorised and required, to procure and present to Lieut. JOSEPH CROSS, a sword, in testimony of the high sense of approbation the legislature entertain of his gallant conduct in the late war; and the Governor is hereby authorized to draw upon the Treasurer of the Western Shore for such sum as he may deem necessary to carry into effect this resolution.

From the National Intelligencer, 20th Feb. 1830.

PRESENTATION OF A SWORD.

EDITORS' CORRESPONDENCE.

ANNAPOLIS, Feb. 17, 1830.

This day Governor CARROLL presented to Lieutenant JOSEPH CROSS, of the United States Navy, a Sword, in compliance with a resolution of the General Assembly of Maryland, for his gallant conduct during the late war. In doing it the Governor said—

Lieutenant CROSS:—In compliance with a resolution of the General Assembly of Maryland, I have the high gratification to present this sword. It is a testimonial of the estimation in which your conduct, during the late war, is held by the Representatives of the People in your native State. It is an offering of gratitude for the services you have rendered your country.

The bravery and skill displayed by those who engaged in the late war, have proved to all nations that the rights of our citizens will never be assailed with impunity—that our national flag will ever be protected. And I take pleasure in saying that, among those who thus contributed to elevate the character of the country, your name has been enrolled. And now, in the performance of this my official duty, permit me to express my wishes, as an individual, for your prosperity and happiness.

LIEUT. CROSS'S REPLY.

I am deeply sensible, sir, of the high honor conferred upon me by the Legislature of my native State, by the proceedings of which you have just advised me. The humble station which I filled in the conflicts to which those proceedings refer, entitles me to no such rare distinction, and it must be ascribed to the kind partiality of the Legislature, rather than any merit of mine. It is, I own, a pleasing reflection with me, that it was my good fortune to assist in those achievements; but I can lay claim to nothing beyond an ardent zeal in the discharge of the humble duties assigned to me on those occasions. I accept the sword, with profound gratitude for the honor which has been done me by the Legislature; and, for the very flattering terms in which your Excellency has been pleased to address me on this occasion, I beg you to receive my sincere acknowledgments.

ARRIVALS AT WASHINGTON,

April 10—Lieut. R. B. Screven, 4th Infy. Gadsby's.
 14—Ass't Surgeon M. Mills, do.
 Col. J. Bankhead, 3d Arty. do.
 17—Lieut. J. Allen Smith, do. Fuller's.
 Lieut. R. H. K. Whiteley, 2d Arty. do.

LETTERS ADVERTISED.

WASHINGTON, April 15.

ARMY.—Capt. Jacob Brown, 3, Lieut. R. S. Dix, Gen. A. Eustis, Lieut. M. S. Miller.

NAVY.—Mid S. F. Blunt, Lieut. S. Champlin, Lieut. J. S. Chauncey, P. Mid. J. L. Henderson, Lt. Comdt. J. Tattnell.

MARINE CORPS.—Lieut. J. T. Sprague.

PHILADELPHIA, April 15.

ARMY AND NAVY.—Capt. Ward Marston, Ferdinand Pepin, S. F. Dupont, Wm. B. Wallace, John C. Spencer, G. G. Farrar, Lloyd J. Beall, W. S. W. Ruschenberger.

PENSACOLA, April 1.

NAVY.—Lieuts. E. T. Doughty, W. McBlair, S. C. Gist, 2, J. P. McKinstry, S. C. Rowan, R. Semmes, 4, W. Smith, Dr. T. A. Parsons, Passed Mid. W. Chandler, O. Fairfax, 3, G. J. Wyche, Mid. N. Barnes, Jr. A. B. Davis, R. S. Love, L. Maynard, J. W. E. Reid, L. C. Sartori, L. M. Wilkins, J. C. Williamson.

U. S. Ship *Natchez*.—Capt. W. Mervine, 2, Lieuts. E. Peck, 2, J. B. Cutting, 2, E. W. Moore, T. G. Benham, 4, M. Smith, 5. Drs. J. R. Chandler, 3, S. Sharp, 5. Purser S. Ramsey, 17. P. Mid. D. McDougall, 6, C. S. Ridgley, 2. Mid. F. B. Renshaw, 2, N. Collins, 3, C. Saunders, 5, T. F. Davis, H. Skipwith, 2, W. Shields.

U. S. Ship *St. Louis*.—Capt. Thos. Paine, 10. Lts. H. H. Bell, Jas. F. Schenck, 7, J. M. Gardner, 3. Dr. Geo. W. Evans, 6. P. Mid. G. R. Gray, 3. Mid. J. A. Doyle, 3, J. C. Williamson, 3, B. Morgan, 3, W. H. Adams, 6.

U. S. Ship *Concord*.—Capt. M. P. Mix, Lts. T. J. Leib, H. A. Adams, 10, W. L. Howard, S. E. Munn, 2, C. H. Kennedy, 2, J. P. McKinstry, 5. Drs. Mifflin Coulter, T. A. Parsons, Wm. Spotswood. Purser N. Wilson, 5. P. Mid. G. M. White, 2, Spotswood, 3. Mid. T. M. Mix, W. H. Adams, Wm. M. Caldwell, 4, B. Barret, 3, T. N. Wingate. Prof. B. McGowan, 2.

U. S. Ship *Vandalia*.—Lt. J. W. Mooers. Mid. R. N. Stembel, J. Eary.

U. S. Schooner *Grampus*.—Lt. Jos. Stallings, 9, S. Swartwout, 8. P. Mid. Wm. Chandler, 4, J. M. Lockert, 9. Pur. T. M. Taylor, 13. Mid. W. L. Parkinson, 2, S. D. Trenchard, 5, G. W. Grant, 2.

MARINE CORPS.—Lt. F. B. McNeill.

REVENUE CUTTER SERVICE.—Capt. W. Foster, 2. Lieuts. Gay Moore, T. A. Osborne, W. B. Whitehead.

PASSENGERS.

NEW YORK, April 16, per brig Douglas, from Rio Janeiro, Lieut. H. Eagle of the navy.

April 17, per ship Niagara, from Charleston, Major W. Gates, of the army.

April 18, per ship Newark, from Savannah, Col. A. Cummings, Major G. Dearborn, and Lieut. W. C. De Hart, of the army.

CHARLESTON, April 11, per steamboat Wm. Seabrook, from Savannah, Lieut. J. A. Smith, of the army.

April 12, per steam packet Columbia, from New York, Major J. S. McIntosh, of the army.

April 14, per steam packet South Carolina, for Norfolk, Lieuts. J. Allen Smith, and R. H. K. Whiteley, of the army.

April 17, per steam packet Georgia, from Norfolk, Lieut. R. S. Pinckney, of the navy.

SAVANNAH, April 7, per ship Milledgville, from New York, Mid. W. A. Wayne, of the navy.

April 9, per steam packet Forester, from Garey's Ferry, Lieuts. M. M. Clark and J. A. Smith, of the army.

April 10, per steamboat Wm. Seabrook, from Charleston, Lieut. Smith of the army.

MOBILE, April 9, per steamboat Champion, from Pensacola, Capt. B. Dufany and Lieut. G. Gansevoort, U. S. N., Major H. Wilson, U. S. A.

COMMUNICATIONS.

COURTS MARTIAL.

MR. EDITOR:—I have read with interest your remarks in relation to Courts Martial, and while I agree with you on some points, I think that you have taken erroneous views on others. It is unquestionably a subject of vital importance to the service, and should be treated calmly and dispassionately. As you cannot be supposed to speak from experience, it is to be inferred that you derive your information partly from individuals; if so, may we not presume that it is from the disaffected portion, with which every service and profession is more or less encumbered. Our navy is not exempt from the evil.

In the few remarks which I shall offer, I wish it to be understood that I am actuated by a desire to benefit the whole, and not any particular class, party, or clique.

It should be premised that Courts Martial ought to be viewed in the light of Courts of *Honor*, more than in that of Courts of *Law*. The fundamental principle of every military service is subordination—strict unhesitating and unquestioning obedience. Every thing tends to this one object, and occasions frequently occur in which the safety of the whole body depends upon the integrity with which it is preserved. The necessity for passive obedience is more apparent on board a vessel of war, than in military bodies on shore; in the latter case when acting in detachments, the foresight of one leader may repair the faults of another, but in a ship of war never. One mind must guide—one spirit animate—one eye or voice direct the whole. All acknowledge, for all must perceive, the importance of discipline; the slightest deviation from the straight path must be visited with a reproof and punishment, for example's sake. Hence, all know that if they err, their faults will be exposed.

Confined as officers and crews are, for months and years, in the limited space of a ship's decks, opportunities are afforded for studying character and disposition. The virtues and the faults of each are manifested to the others. The mischievous spirits, the idle and the depraved, if any such exist in the community, are sure to be detected. Should offences be committed, so glaring as to require a Court Martial, the laws and regulations prescribe the manner of organizing a court. If the form of proceeding do not partake of that strictly legal character which marks civil judicial tribunals, they ought not to be less binding; nor should the guilty be suffered to escape because there is a "flaw in the indictment," or some trifling informality in the proceedings. It can very soon be determined by the course of evidence, whether the accused party be really guilty or not; and, if guilty, what meed of punishment he deserves. The sentences may to the uninitiated sometimes appear harsh; and probably the accused party makes the best of his case for the satisfaction of his friends, and fancies himself aggrieved by the condemnation of his peers, when the good of the service demanded that the rigors of the law should be visited upon him. This apparent severity arises from the different views taken of the same subject by men in different positions in life. What may seem trivial or venial to the civilian, is arrant treason in the eyes of a sailor or soldier.

P.

[We hope our correspondent will continue to give us his views on Courts Martial. We can assure him that the opinions we expressed are not derived from any of the disaffected members of the service, (if any such there be) but are the result of several years observation of the proceedings and sentences of Courts. A conviction has been forced upon us that the whole system needed revision. What the remedy should be, we will not undertake to say.—EDITOR.]

COMMANDERS & THEIR SUBORDINATES.

MR. EDITOR:—In further illustration of the great impropriety of any body of military men expressing approbation or disapprobation of their immediate commanding officers, I send you herewith an extract from Hough's treatise on Courts Martial, in which you will perceive that this very subject is treated with becoming severity.

I know nothing of the presentation of plate to Commodore Elliott, as mentioned in your paper of the 6th inst., but take it for granted that it has been made. This manner of propitiating the favor of a commander is subversive of discipline, and should be discountenanced by all who place any value upon the efficiency of our navy. A commander should look only to his government and his country (next to his own conscience) for approbation of his official conduct. If he attempts to seek it from his inferiors, there must be a consciousness of a lack of merit; and if he condescends to accept a present from them, it manifests a spirit of avarice highly culpable.

TRITON.

[EXTRACT.]

46. *Inferiors not to present Addresses to Superiors.* G. O. C. C., 25th Jan. 1820. "The Most Noble the Com. in chief has directed the following G. O., issued from the Horse Guards, to be entered in the standing orders of the army serving under this presidency, and to enjoin officers in command to cause the same to be strictly obeyed."

G. O. H. G., 18th Jan. 1810.—"The Com. in chief has directed the following order, issued by the gen. officer comg. H. M.'s forces in North America, to be inserted in the G. O. of the army."

G. O. Quebec, 4th Oct. 1809.—"The Com. of the forces has lately had occasion to see in a Halifax newspaper, a copy of an address presented by the serjts. of the 1st batn. of the Royal Fusileers to Capt. Orr, on that officer relinquishing the adjutancy, in consequence of being promoted to a company. So novel a circumstance could not fail to draw the attention of H. E., it being the first of the kind that has come to his knowledge during the forty-six years that he has been in the service; and as the first instance has thus (so far as he is aware at least) occurred in the part of the army with the charge of which the King has been pleased to entrust him, he feels himself called on, by every obligation of duty to H. M. and the service, to bear his testimony against it by a public expression of disapprobation.

"H. E. does not mean in this instance, to ascribe any improper motive to the serjts. He has no doubt that their sole view was to express their regard and gratitude towards an officer, who, in the intimate connexion that had officially subsisted between them, had very commendably conducted himself with kindness to them, without departing from that strictness of discipline, which was indispensable to the discharge of his duty.

"But while H. E. thus does justice to the intention of the serjts. of the Royal Fusileers, he desires, at the same time, very seriously to observe to them, that in presuming to meet, in order to deliberate on the conduct of their superior officer, they have, in fact, however unintentionally, been guilty of an act of great insubordination.

"It matters not that the design of the meeting, or in whatever manner the address was unanimously assented to, was solely to express their respect and esteem; the very circumstance implies discussion, and by that discussion they rendered themselves obnoxious to the imputation alluded to. Who, indeed, shall say where such a practice, if once introduced, shall end?

"If the non-commissd. officers of a regt. are permitted to express their *approbation* of the conduct of the *adjt.*, why may they not exercise the same right

with respect to their *comg. officer*? Or what reason can be given why they should not equally be entitled to express their *disapprobation*? Indeed, should the practice become general, the merely withholding the former would imply the latter.

"Gen. Sir James Craig is the more desirous that his sentiments on this subject should be distinctly understood in the fusileers, because it appears on the face of the address of the serjts. in question, that it has been countenanced by the officer who then commanded the regt. The Com. of the forces does no more than justice to the character and services of that officer, when he admits, that feeling, as he does, the dangerous tendency of the practice which he is censuring, he also feels himself the more bound to oppose in the first instance, from the strength which it might otherwise derive from the sanction which he appears to have given to it. Lieut. Col P. will, however, believe, that though it was impossible the Gen. should avoid this observation upon his error, yet his doing so can by no means detract from the esteem with which he has been taught to view his character as an officer, or the confidence which he should be disposed to place in his services.

(Signed) "E. BAYNES, Adj. Gen. to the British Army serving in North America."

"The reason for which the Com. in chief has directed the circulation of this order is, that he may avail himself of this opportunity of declaring to the army, his most perfect concurrence in the sentiments therein expressed by the distinguished and experienced officer by whom it was framed, on a subject, which appears to have been by some very much misunderstood. The circumstances of *inferiors* of any class of military men, assembling for the purpose of bestowing praise and public marks of approbation on their *superiors*, implies a power of deliberation on their conduct which belongs to the king alone, or to those officers to whom H. M. may be pleased to entrust the command and discipline of his troops.

"It is a procedure equally objectionable, whether in the higher or lower ranks of the army, and as the Com. in chief cannot but regard it as a principle subversive of all military discipline, he trusts it is a practice which will be forever banished from the British service, as deserving of the highest censure, and he directs officers in command, to act accordingly.

By command:

(Signed) H CALVERT Adj. Gen."

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE.

SAVANNAH, April 10.

FROM FLORIDA.—The Steamer Forester, Captain Dillon, arrived yesterday afternoon from Black Creek.

The dates from the Army are to the 5th, and from Fort Heileman the 7th. From a passenger, and the Captain of the F. we learn that Abraham and family, who were at Fort Dade, state that Micanopy, Jumper, Philip and Powell had started for Tampa Bay on the 3d inst.

Tigertail and his band have arrived at Fort Armstrong, and Cloud and Alligator are at Tampa Bay.

It is now conceded that the war is at an end, and that there will be no more fighting.—*Georgian*.

AUTHENTIC FROM FLORIDA.—Extract from a letter written by an intelligent officer of the Army, dated fort Dade, (Florida,) April 3, 1837:

"General Jesup has gone to Tampa Bay. The second brigade accompanies him to a point on the Little Hillsborough, about seven miles from Tampa. The Indians are coming in very slowly, but there is no reason to doubt their sincerity. Tiger-tail's party, consisting of about two hundred, have been in some days, and Abraham arrived this evening *with all his live stock*. Alligator and Cloud, with their people, have arrived at Tampa Bay.

"We expect the Indians will all be embarked before the end of this month, and by the first of May we hope to have our faces turned to our stations."—*Nat. Int.*

From the Norfolk Beacon, April 14.

NAVAL.—The United States sloop of war, *Fairfield*, Commander Mayo, dropped down from the Navy Yard yesterday morning to the anchorage off the Naval Hospital preparatory to her sailing. Her destination is the coast of Brazil.

The frigate *Sirene*, Admiral Duportet, for Brest and Andromede, Capt. Villeneuve, for Rio de Janeiro, will sail from Hampton Roads to-morrow—weather permitting.

MILITARY.—Captain Fulton and Lieut. Bryant's companies of U. S. Dragoons, will embark from Fortress Monroe on Sunday next, in the schr. *Virginian*, Capt. Bedell, for New Orleans.

CHARLESTON, April 13.

LOUISVILLE, CINCINNATI AND CHARLESTON RAIL ROAD.—A number of engineers have recently passed through this place on their way to Flat Rock, in North Carolina, to join Capt. WILLIAMS, to enter immediately upon their duties. Mr. DRAYTON who was sent on the North immediately after the organization of the company to procure instruments, has found much difficulty in procuring them, and with every possible exertion on his part, as well as on the part of Major McNEILL, it is not believed that an adequate supply can be procured before the 1st of May. No time, however, has been, or will be lost in prosecuting the surveys as vigorously as possible.—*Patriot.*

PENSACOLA, April 8.—The U. S. sloop of war *Boston* arrived on Sunday last from Vera Cruz, where she had remained several weeks. The *Boston* sailed from this port on the 6th of February; arrived on the 7th off the S. W. Pass, and sailed on the 8th for Vera Cruz, which place she reached on the 18th of Feb. Sailed thence on the 16th March, and arrived off Tampico on the 20th; communicating with the Natchez, lying at the latter place, and sailed the same day for this port.

The *Boston* arrived at Vera Cruz only the day before the arrival of the barque *Pioneer*, with General Santa Anna on board. It is conjectured that the presence of the *Boston* at Vera Cruz, and the fact that Gen. Santa Anna was conveyed home in an U. S. vessel, had a material influence on the fortunes of that distinguished individual. We understand that when the *Boston* arrived at Vera Cruz, it was known at that place that a decree of the Supreme Government was in preparation at Mexico, by which Santa Anna was to be banished the republic. Nothing has since been heard of the measure, owing, it is supposed, to the intelligence communicated by the *Boston*, of the sailing of Santa Anna in one of our national ships, which intelligence was immediately despatched to Mexico from Vera Cruz.

A friend on board the *Boston* has kindly furnished us with a file of Vera Cruz papers up to the 15th March. Santa Anna was then still at his plantation, near Vera Cruz. He had addressed a communication to Tornel, Secretary of War, reiterating the assurances already made by Santa Anna, that he had entered into no treaty with the Texans or the United States, by which the honor or the interests of Mexico could be at all compromised, and promising in a short time to lay before the people and government of Mexico, a manifesto explaining every thing that has occurred during his absence from the Republic.—*Gazette.*

The Steamboat Merchant, Capt. Baker, arrived here on Monday evening last, on her way to Tampa Bay, and left here on Wednesday, being detained one day by bad weather. The M. has been chartered to transport the Indians from Tampa. We understand

that Gen. Jesup and suite will also return in her. Captain Page, the Agent of the Government for effecting the transportation of the Creek Indians across the Mississippi, is on board the Merchant.—*Ibid.*

Gazetteer of the State of Missouri, with a map of the State from the office of the Surveyor General, &c. &c. By Alphonso Wetmore, of Missouri, C. Keemly, St. Louis, Harper & Brothers, New York.

Major Wetmore, the author of this very valuable work, was a gallant officer of the army in the late war with Great Britain, and lost his right arm at the storming of Fort Erie. But the arm that is left has proved in this instance that he knows as well how to write as to fight. The book is well written, well digested, and the topographical and statistical maps of information which it contains, put together with great care and accuracy. The author has been assisted in his labors by contributions from a very large number of the most distinguished individuals connected with the annals of the western country; among whom the names of Gen. Atkinson, Mr. Linn, the Senator from Missouri, and numerous others, furnish sufficient guarantee of the worth and ability of the work. But the boon needs no such guarantee. Its value is stamped upon its own pages. To the citizens of Missouri, and to those emigrants to that State, the publication must be invaluable. Nor will it be much less interesting to the lovers of Indian and backwoods romance, as there is a copious appendix containing frontier sketches and illustrations of Indian character which add very much to the worth of the work. It is exceedingly well got up, and is embellished with a beautiful steel engraving of a bear hunt upon the prairies.—*N. Y. Gazette.*

Governor Cass, the American Minister to France, we learn from the *New York Times*, will make an excursion this summer up the Mediterranean in the Constitution frigate, Com. Elliott. He is to embark at Marseilles, with his family, about March 25th. Constantinople will be visited, and we suppose also Alexandria, Athens, and the Barbary towns, with a view probably to adjust existing treaties, the visit of the Minister not being, we apprehend, one of mere pleasure.

From the New Orleans True American, April 5.

DINNER TO CAPTAIN ROUSSEAU.—Yesterday a public dinner was given to that gallant and estimable officer, Captain Lawrence Rousseau, by his fellow citizens of Louisiana, in congratulation of his promotion to the post of captain in the navy of the United States. The company amounted to about one hundred gentlemen, and sat down to a repast at the Perfect Union Lodge. Mr. Bernard Marigny presided, assisted by Col. Peire and Judge Canonge, as Vice Presidents. Many appropriate toasts and sentiments were given, and perfect harmony and good feeling prevailed throughout the assembly.

LIGHT HOUSES, &c.—The *Boston Transcript* of Wednesday says, orders were received yesterday from the Board of Navy Commissioners, for carrying into effect the provisions of the 2d Section of the Act of the last Congress, making appropriation for Light Houses. Com. Downes has been directed to superintend the surveys in the vicinity of the harbor of Boston, and on the coast as far eastward as the boundary line of the State. Captain Smith is charged with the examination of the coast of Maine, and Commander Percival is directed to examine the sites designated for Light Houses, Buoys, Beacons, &c. within the District of Barnstable.

NEW YORK, April 18.

The ship *Mississippi*, Hall, that sailed yesterday for New Orleans has on board Capt. Tompkins' officers, and near 300 troops. A small faux pas, took place

as respects this ship. A company of troops were ordered out to salute her in going out of the river which was to be at 12 o'clock, noon—but a little before 12, the ship Republic passed by, saluted by the company, the band playing "Home, sweet Home." &c. taking her for the Mississippi—and then marched home.—*Gazette.*

MISCELLANY.

From "the Americans," by Francis J. Grund.

REV. MR. TAYLOR.

I have been so fortunate as to hear several sermons preached by the Rev. Mr. Taylor, at the seamen's church in Boston, and have listened with intense pleasure to his pathetic exhortations to industry and sobriety. He had himself been a sailor on board of an American man-of-war, and understood admirably how to touch the feelings of his audience. His expressions were occasionally intermixed with seamen's phrases which it was easy to perceive, produced the desired effect. He would sometimes in the midst of a sermon call upon individuals, and especially on captains of vessels, to use their personal influence in suppressing the vice of intemperance, and to exhort the men under their command to a proper worship of God, and obedience to his laws. It was a moving scene to hear these sturdy navigators reply in the affirmative, and pledge their honors and their faith to fulfil the injunction of their preacher.

Mr. Taylor possesses evidently great powers of oratory, which he employs in the most humane and charitable manner, for the benefit of his fellow-creatures. His church is always crowded, and in the countenances of his hearers may be read the effects of his eloquence. I have never listened to sermons more deeply imbued with the spirit and sanctity of religion, than those of "the sailor's minister;" and I can only wish, for the sake of his noble and disinterested undertaking, that he may preserve his original simplicity and vigor of style, and not be misled into an unprofitable imitation of the flights and tropes of his colleagues.

A large number of sailors employed in the American merchant service are foreigners; but I do not remember having known many of them advance to mates and masters of vessels. The officers of American ships are generally natives of the United States,—and, without any national prejudice, it is easy to assign the reason. A sailor is a jolly, jovial, careless being, all the world over. He thinks less of the future than men of any other occupation in life; and, being provided against physical wants, gives himself up to merriment. "Perils," says Bacon, "love to be rewarded with pleasure;" but the American sailor's reward is promotion.

Being, generally, better educated than the seamen of other nations, and prudent and economical by instinct, a Yankee tar will not think of advancement on board of his ship, but speculates also in the probability of his becoming a merchant. Encouraged by the success of many before him, and as is often the case, by that of his commander, he employs his leisure hours rather in the study of navigation, than in frivolous recreations, which would only retard his progress in life. He is perhaps as gay as any other sailor; but in the above things he is a Yankee, and as much intent on bettering his condition; and in this laudable undertaking he is seconded by his employers.

If he does not succeed, it is in most cases his own fault; for it would be difficult to conceal either talent or inferiority from such watchful eyes as those of his officers, who, with very few exceptions, have gone through the same career themselves, and are the best judges of his ability and character.

There exists, if I mistake not, a strong aversion amongst American merchants to trust themselves or their property to the care of captains, who in the language of sailors, "have crept through the cabin win-

dows;" while, on the other hand, they are most liberal patrons of those who, by courage or dexterity, have acquired a just title to their favor. Hence, merit is sure of its reward; and there is no stronger inducement to exertion.

The merchants of the large Atlantic cities have liberally contributed towards the establishment of churches exclusively for the religious instruction and improvement of mariners. Savings banks have been formed under the auspices of the most enlightened citizens, who have volunteered their services as presidents and directors, and a project for the establishment of naval schools, to educate seamen for the merchant service, is now before Congress.

Religion, and voluntary abstinence from the use of ardent spirits, have had a prodigious influence on the moral habits of the sailors, and have saved thousands of them from that mental degradation to which they are continually exposed by their occupation and habits of life; and into which they are often misled, even by the best features of their character.

CAPTAIN KIDD.—From the history of New York, by William Smith, published in the year 1756.

"During the late war (in 1696) the seas were extremely infested with English pirates, some of whom sailed from New York; and it was strongly suspected that they received too much countenance even from the government. The Earl of Bellemont received affidavits from the East India Company that Governor Fletcher had permitted pirates to land their spoils in the province of New York, and that Governor Nicoll had bargained for their protection. After considering the matter, the council advised his excellency to send Fletcher home, but to try Nicoll here, because his estate would not bear the expense of a trial in England, &c. &c." The author goes on to say: "It is nevertheless certain that the pirates were frequently in the sound, and supplied with provisions by the inhabitants of Long Island, who, for many years afterwards, were so infatuated with the notion that the pirates buried great quantities of money along the coast, that there is scarce a point of land or an island without the mark of their *auri sacra fames*."

"Before the Earl of Bellemont set out for America, he became acquainted with Robert Livingston, Esq., who was then in England soliciting his own affairs. The Earl took occasion in one of his conferences with Mr. Livingston, to mention the scandal the province was under on account of the pirates; the latter confessed it was not without reason, and brought the Earl acquainted with Captain Kidd, whom he recommended as a man of integrity and courage, that knew the pirates and their rendezvous and would undertake to apprehend them if the King employed him in a good sailing frigate of 30 guns, and 150 men. This project dropped through, owing to the uncertainty of the adventure. Mr. Livingston then proposed a private adventure against the pirates, offering to be concerned with Kidd—a fifth in the ship and charges, and to be bound for Kidd's faithful execution of the commission. The King approved of the design, and reserved a tenth share (of profits?); Lord Chancellor Somers, the Earls of Romney and Oxford, Sir Edward Harrison and others joined in the scheme, agreeing to the expense of £6000.

Kidd sailed from Plymouth for New York in April 1696; and afterwards (as is here said) turned pirate, burnt his ship and came to Boston, (in about the year 1699) when the Earl apprehended him. The Rochester man of war was sent for him, but being driven back, a general suspicion prevailed in England that all was collision between the ministry and adventurers, who, it was thought, were unwilling that Kidd should be brought home, lest he might discover that the Chancellor, the Duke and others were confederates in the piracy. The matter even proceeded

and for the *promiscuous timber* of each class, separately from the other; all of which other is considered moulded timber.

The whole to be delivered before the first day of July, 1838, and as much sooner as practicable.

The said Live Oak timber must have grown within twenty-five miles of the sea board, (which must be proven to the satisfaction of the respective commandants,) must be got out by the moulds and written directions, and specifications of dimensions, &c. which will be furnished to contractors for their government; and must be free from all injuries and defects, which may impair the good quality of the said timber for the purposes for which it is required by contract, and be in all respects satisfactory to the commandants of the respective navy yards where it is delivered.

Bonds, with two good and responsible sureties, (whose names must be forwarded with the offers,) in the amount of one-third the estimated value of the timber to be furnished under the respective contracts, will be required; and, as collateral security for the faithful compliance with the terms, stipulations, and conditions, of the said contracts, ten per centum will be reserved from the actual amount of each payment which may be made, from time to time, within thirty days after bills shall be duly approved and presented to the Navy Agents, until the said contracts are completed and closed; which reservations, respectively, will be forfeited to the use and benefit of the United States, in the event of failures to deliver the timber within the respective periods prescribed by the contractors.

The moulds will be furnished to the contractors, at one of the Navy Yards, Brooklyn, Gosport, or Philadelphia.

March 23—415J.

NAVY COMMISSIONERS' OFFICE, }
23d March, 1837.

ASH TIMBER.—Sealed proposals, endorsed "*Proposals for Ash Timber*," will be received at this office until 3 o'clock, P. M. of the first of May next, for furnishing at the navy yard, Washington, [one-half by the first of December next, and the other half by the first of June, eighteen hundred and thirty-eight, or as much earlier as the contractor may choose,] twelve thousand cubic feet of White Ash Timber, to be of the following dimensions, viz:

The whole to be in logs of from twelve to eighteen feet in length; one-fifth of the whole quantity to be sixteen inches diameter; one-fifth twenty inches; one-fifth twenty-six inches; one-fifth thirty inches; and one-fifth thirty-six in diameter.

The whole must be perfectly sound, and free from all defects, subject to the inspection and measurement of persons appointed by the commandant of the yard, and in all respects to his entire satisfaction.

Persons wishing to offer, must offer for at least half the quantity, and state the price asked per cubic foot.

Payments will be made within thirty days after the whole quantity is delivered, and approved bills presented to the Navy Agent.

Bonds, with two sureties in one-third the estimated amount of the contract, will be required for its faithful performance.

March 30—td

NAVY COMMISSIONERS' OFFICE, }
18th March, 1837.

LIVE OAK TIMBER.—Sealed proposals will be received at this office until three o'clock, p. m. of the first day of July next, for the supply of Live Oak Timber, as follows:

No. 1. For the frame timber, beam and keelson pieces, and for the promiscuous timber which may be directed, for one ship of the line, one frigate, two sloops of war, (one of each class,) and one smaller vessel; to be delivered at the *Navy Yard near Portsmouth, N. H.*

No. 2. For the frame timber, beam and keelson pieces, and for the promiscuous timber, which may be directed, for one ship of the line, one frigate, and one steamer; to be delivered at the *Navy Yard at Charlestown, Mass.*

No. 3. For the frame timber, beam and keelson pieces, and for the promiscuous timber which may be directed, for one ship of the line, one sloop of war, large class, one small vessel, and one steamer; to be delivered at the *Navy Yard, Charlestown, Mass.*

No. 4. For the frame timber, beam and keelson pieces, and for the promiscuous timber which may be directed for one ship of the line, one frigate, and one steamer; to be delivered at the *Navy Yard, Brooklyn, New York.*

No. 5. For the frame timber, beam and keelson pieces, and for the promiscuous timber which may be directed, for one ship of the line, one sloop of war, large class, and one steamer; to be delivered at the *Navy Yard, Brooklyn, New York.*

No. 6. For the frame timber, beam and keelson pieces, and for the promiscuous timber, which may be directed, for two sloops of war, large class, and two steamers; to be delivered at the *Navy Yard at Philadelphia.*

The quantity and dimensions of the promiscuous timber for each vessel, of each class, is as follows:

For each *ship of the line* 6,000 cubic feet; which must be sided 15 inches, and be from 12 to 20 feet in length, six of the longest pieces to side 22 inches.

For each *frigate*, 3,000 cubic feet, which must be sided 15 inches, and be from 12 to 20 feet long, six of the longest pieces to side 19 inches.

For each *sloop of war*, 1,500 cubic feet, which must be sided 12 inches, and be from 12 to 18 feet long; six of the longest pieces to side 16 inches.

For each *steamer*, 1,500 cubic feet, which must be sided 15 inches, and be from 12 to 18 feet long; six of the longest pieces to side 16 inches.

For each small vessel, 800 cubic feet, which must be sided 8 inches, and be from 10 to 16 feet long, six of the longest pieces to side 12 1-2 inches.

A part of the promiscuous timber may be got to larger dimensions, provided the pieces will answer for replacing defective hawse pieces, transoms, breast hooks, or other valuable pieces.

Separate offers must be made for each of the preceding numbers, and each offer must embrace all the timber that is called for by the number to which it refers; the prices asked per cubic foot must be stated separately for each and every class of vessels embraced in the offer, and for the *promiscuous timber* of each class separately from the other; all of which other is considered moulded timber.

At least one fourth of the whole quantity of timber embraced in each offer, comprising a fair proportion of the most valuable pieces, must be delivered on or before the last of March, 1839; one half of the remainder on or before the last of March, 1840, and the whole quantity on or before the last of March, 1841; and if the above proportions shall not be delivered at the respective times above specified, the Commissioners of the Navy reserve to themselves the right of cancelling any contract, in the execution of which such failure may occur, and of entering into new contracts, holding the original contractors and their sureties liable for any excess of cost, and other damages, which may be thus incurred.

The said live oak timber must have grown within twenty five miles of the seaboard, (which must be proven to the satisfaction of the respective Commandants,) must be got out by the moulds and written directions, and specifications of dimensions, &c. which will be furnished to the contractors for their government, and must be free from all injuries and defects which may impair the good qualities of the said timber for the purposes for which it is required by contract, and be in all respects satisfactory to the Commandants of the respective navy yards where it is delivered.

Bonds, with two good and responsible sureties (whose names must be forwarded with the offers) in the amount of one-third the estimated value of the timber to be furnished under the respective contracts, will be required; and, as collateral security for the faithful compliance with the terms, stipulations, and conditions of the said contracts, ten per centum will be reserved from the actual amount of each payment which may be made from time to time, within thirty days after bills shall be duly approved and presented to the Navy Agent, until the said contracts are completed and closed; which reservations, respectively, will be forfeited to the use and benefit of the United States, in the event of the failures to deliver the timber within the respective periods prescribed.

The moulds will be furnished to the contractors at one of the Navy Yards, Brooklyn, Gosport, or Philadelphia.

March 23—4J15.